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USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

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AMCONSUL DHAHRAN PRIORITY

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY

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LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, NATO, XF

SUBJ: ASSISTANT SECRETARY ATHERTON'S BRIEFING OF THE NAC ON
MIDDLE EAST AGREEMENT, SEPTEMBER 5

SUMMARY

ASSISTANT SECRETARY ATHERTON BRIEFED THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL ON SEPTEMBER 5 ON THE ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN INTERIM SINAI AGREEMENT SIGNED IN GENEVA ON SEPTEMBER 4. MR ATHERTON'S BRIEFING COVERED THE EVOLUTION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, DESCRIBED THE NEGOTIATIONS AND THEIR BASIC ELEMENTS, DEALT WITH THE US ROLE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, AND COVERED THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE. THIS PARTICULARLY TIMELY BRIEFING WAS DEEPLY APPRECIATED BY ALLIED REPS WHO EXPRESSED GREAT SATISFACTION WITH THE OUTCOME OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND WHO PRAISED THE US ROLE IN BRINGING ABOUT THE SETTLEMENT. THEY PARTICULARLY COMMENDED THE PERSONAL ROLE PLAYED BY THE SECRETARY AND MANY NOTED THAT THE SUCCESS GREATLY ENHANCES THE US ROLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AS WELL AS THE OVERALL PRESTIGE OF THE US. IN THEIR QUESTIONING, ALLIED REPS ASKED MR ATHERTON ABOUT DETAILS OF THE US ROLE IN THE EARLY WARNING SYSTEM TO BE ESTABLISHED, THE ROLE AND ATTITUDE OF THE SOVIET UNION IN THE MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT, AND ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR A SYRIAN-ISRAELI AGREEMENT ON THE GOLAN HEIGHTS AS WELL AS ABOUT THE ROLE OF THE PLO AND FUTURE OF THE STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH. IN RESPONSE, ATHERTON EMPHASIZED THAT THE US RECOGNIZED SOVIET COOPERATION WOULD BE NECESSARY IN ACHIEVING AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT AND THAT U.S. WAS NOT SEEKING TO EXCLUDE THE USSR FROM THAT PROCESS; SAID THAT WE WERE DETERMINED TO DO WHAT WE COULD TO HELP KEEP THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS GOING INCLUDING EXPLORING THE POSSIBILITIES OF A SYRIAN-ISRAELI NEGOTIATION IF THE PARTIES WISHED US TO; AND EXPLAINED WHY INJECTION OF THE PLO ISSUE WOULD BE PREMATURE AND DISRUPTIVE AT THIS STAGE. END SUMMARY

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1. THE SECRETARY GENERAL OPENED THE COUNCIL SESSION BY OFFERING ON BEHALF OF THE COUNCIL HIS CONGRATULATIONS TO THE US AND ITS SECRETARY OF STATE ON ACHIEVING A BREAKTHROUGH IN NEGOTIATIONS TOWARD A PEACE SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST. HE ALSO MENTIONED HIS GRATITUDE TO THE SECRETARY FOR SENDING ASSISTANT SECRETARY ATHERTON, WHO HAD BEEN IN ON ALL THE NEGOTIATIONS, TO BRIEF THE COUNCIL.

2. ATHERTON SAID HE WAS HAPPY TO BE BACK AGAIN TO BRIEF THE COUNCIL ON THE SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSIONS OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS. HE SAID HE DID NOT HAVE A FORMAL BRIEFING PAPER THAT COULD BE DISTRIBUTED. HOWEVER, COPIES OF THE AGREEMENT COULD BE OBTAINED FROM THE US MISSION IF DESIRED. HE SAID HE WOULD MAKE A BRIEF REPORT AND THEN ANSWER QUESTIONS.

3. ATHERTON SAID SECRETARY KISSINGER WANTED HIM TO BRIEF THE

ALLIES AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE ON THE LATEST MIDDLE EAST MISSION. THE SECRETARY HIMSELF, IT WOULD BE UNDERSTOOD, HAD TO RETURN IMMEDIATELY TO WASHINGTON TO REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND BE AVAILABLE TO THE CONGRESS, SINCE THERE IS INTENSE INTEREST IN THE CONGRESS AND IN THE AMERICAN PUBLIC IN THE AGREEMENT JUST CONCLUDED BY EGYPT AND ISRAEL, ESPECIALLY CONCERNING THE NEW ROLE THAT THE US WILL PLAY ON THE GROUND. ATHERTON THEN CONTINUED AS FOLLOWS:

4. THE ALLIES WILL HAVE SEEN AND STUDIED THE TEXTS OF THE AGREEMENT AND ITS ANNEX, AS WELL AS THE PROPOSAL FOR ENTRUSTING TO A SMALL NUMBER OF AMERICAN CIVILIANS THE EARLY WARNING SYSTEM IN THE AREA OF THE GIDDI AND MITLA PASSES IN SINAI IN THE BUFFER ZONE BETWEEN THE FORCES OF THE TWO SIDES.

5. BEFORE DESCRIBING THE MAIN ELEMENTS OF THOSE DOCUMENTS AND SAYING A FEW WORDS ON HOW WE SEE THE DIPLOMATIC PROCESS IN THE PERIOD AHEAD, ATHERTON SAID IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO REVIEW THE EVOLUTION OF EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE PRESENT AGREEMENT.

6. THE ALLIES WOULD RECALL THE DEVELOPMENT OF A STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH TOWARD A SETTLEMENT FOLLOWING THE OCTOBER 1973 WAR.

-- THAT APPROACH WAS BASED ON THE JUDGEMENT THAT A FRONTAL ALL OUT ASSAULT, OF ALL-OR-NOTHING APPROACH WOULD MOST
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PROBABLY LEAD TO STALEMATE AND A REPETITION OF THE DEADLOCKS AND FUTILE WARS OF THE PAST; A JUDGEMENT THAT NEITHER SIDE WAS READY OR ABLE TO COME TO GRIPS IMMEDIATELY AND SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH MAJOR ISSUES SUCH AS THE FINAL BORDERS, TERRITORIAL CLAIMS, FINAL PEACE, POSITION OF THE PALESTINIANS, JERUSALEM, RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL, AND SO ON. OUR JUDGEMENT WAS THAT SUCH AN APPROACH WAS NOT WORKABLE.

-- THE UNDERLYING CONCEPT WAS TO GET A PROCESS STARTED THAT WOULD DEVELOP A DYNAMIC OF ITS OWN AND BUILD THE HABIT OF NEGOTIATION BETWEEN THE ARABS AND ISRAELIS, THAT WOULD LEAD TO SOME MEASURE OF CONFIDENCE THAT THE ULTIMATE OBJECTIVES OF THE TWO SIDES WERE NOT PERMANENTLY INCOMPATIBLE.

7. THIS PROCESS BEGAN SHORTLY AFTER THE OCTOBER WAR AND THE ESSENTIAL GROUNDWORK WAS LAID IN THE TWO SUBSEQUENT DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENTS. OBVIOUSLY, OUR HOPE WAS THAT THIS WOULD BE FOLLOWED BY OTHER STEPS. UNFORTUNATELY, THE MOMENTUM FLAGGED DURING THE LATTER PART OF 1974 AND EARLY 1975 FOR A NUMBER OF REASONS:

-- ISRAEL WAS PREOCCUPIED WITH THE TRAUMA AND DISSENSION CREATED BY THE OCTOBER WAR AND HAD A NEW GOVERNMENT WHICH HAD SUFFICIENT PROBLEMS WITHOUT ALSO TAKING ON HARD DECISIONS OF PEACE.

-- THE ARAB WORLD WAS PREOCCUPIED WITH THE ISSUE OF WHO SHOULD REPRESENT THE PALESTINIANS, AN ISSUE THAT WAS SETTLED AT THE RABAT CONFERENCE IN THE FALL OF 1974 AT WHICH THE PLO WAS RECOGNIZED AS THE SOLE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PALESTINIANS. THIS IN EFFECT REMOVED THE KINGDOM OF JORDAN FROM A ROLE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

-- ALSO THE US WAS PREOCCUPIED WITH ITS OWN UNPRECEDENTED PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION.

8. THE US EFFORT TO REVIVE THE PROCESS DURING THE SECRETARY'S QUICK TRIP IN FEBRUARY AND HIS SHUTTTLING DIPLOMATICALLY BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL IN MARCH SERVED TO HIGHLIGHT THE UNDERLYING DILEMMA OF ANY ARAB-ISRAELI NEGOTIATION WHETHER TOWARD AN INTERIM AGREEMENT OR A FINAL SETTLEMENT;

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-- ISRAEL WOULD HAVE TO GIVE UP SOMETHING TANGIBLE- TERRITORY, WHICH IT SEES AS PROVIDING ADDITIONAL SECURITY - FOR SOMETIHING INTANGIBLE - COMMITMENTS ON PAPER AND WRITTEN AGREEMENTS.

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AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
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9. IT WAS CLEAR FROM THE BEGINNING THAT THERE WERE TWO FUNDAMENTAL REQUIREMENTS THAT WOULD BE NEEDED BY EGYPT FOR SADAT TO JUSTIFY AN AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL POLITICALLY BOTH AT HOME IN EGYPT AND IN THE ARAB WORLD GENERALLY;

-- ONE, ISRAEL WOULD HAVE TO WITHDRAW FROM THE SINAI PASSES.

-- AND TWO, EGYPT WOULD HAVE TO RECOVER THE SINAI OIL FIELDS.

10. IN THE MARCH NEGOTIATIONS ISRAEL, FOR ITS PART, SOUGHT A FORMAL END TO THE STATE OF BELLIGERENCY IN RETURN FOR THESE CONCESSIONS, THIS WOULD IN EFFECT TAKE EGYPT OUT OF THE WAR BOTH MILITARILY AND POLITICALLY, WITH MUCH OF EGYPTIAN AND OTHER ARAB TERRITORY STILL OCCUPIED.

11. IN MARCH IT PROVED IMPOSSIBLE TO BRIDGE THIS GAP. SECRETARY KISSINGER ANNOUNCED THE SUSPENSION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS TO RETURN TO WASHINGTON, AND THE PRESIDENT ORDERED A REASSESSMENT OF OUR POLICY TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH WAS STILL VIABLE OR WHETHER IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO FIND SOME OTHER APPROACH. THE OPTIONS WERE:

-- TO DISENGAGE THE US FROM THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE MOMENT AND TO ALLOW THE SITUATION TO FERMENT;

-- TO REVIVE THE MARCH STEP-BY-STEP NEGOTIATIONS;

-- TO GO FOR AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT IN ONE BITE, PRESUMABLY IN A RE-CONVENED GENEVA CONFERENCE.

12. THE REASSESSMENT HELPED CONTAIN THE SITUATION AND PROVIDED

BREATHING SPACE TO BOTH PARTIES AND ALLOWED THEM ALSO TO REVIEW THEIR OPTIONS AND ALTERNATIVES, WHILE WE WERE REVIEWING OUR OWN.

13. WE REJECTED THE DISENGAGEMENT OPTION WITH THE CONVICTION THAT IT WAS INCOMPATIBLE WITH OUR INTERESTS AND THOSE OF OUR ALLIES, SINCE IT WOULD LEAVE A POLITICAL AND NEGOTIATING VACUUM, CREATING A STALEMENT, REVIVING FRUSTATIONS AND TENSIONS,
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PROVIDING THE SOVIETS AND OPPORTUNITY TO EXPAND THEIR POSITION THROUGH OUT DEFAULT, THREATENING A NEW OIL/ECONOMIC CRISIS, AND LEAD TO THE POSSIBLE RENEWAL OF HOSTILITIES IN THE NOT TOO DISTANT FUTURE.

14. MANY PERSONS IN GOVERNMENT AND INFLUENTIAL PRIVATE CITIZENS URGED US TO GO FOR AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT AND AN IMMEDIATE CONCERNING OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE, AND WE GAVE THIS ALTERNATIVE VERY SERIOUS THOUGHT. THE DIFFICULTY WAS, HOWEVER, THAT ALL OF THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES WOULD IMMEDIATELY CONFRONT THE PARTIES WITH THE HARDEST DECISIONS, IN A FURUM AND UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE THE PARTIES WOULD ALL HAVE MINIMUM NEGOTIATING FLEXIBILITY. IT WAS CLEAR THAT NEITHER SIDE WAS PREPARED TO FACE ALL THESE DECISIONS AT ONCE; THEY ARE MORE THAN THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL PROCESSES OF ALL CONCERNED COULD ACCOMMODATE. THEREFORE, WHEN THE PARTIES ASKED US TO TRY AGAIN TO ACHIEVE AN INTERIM STEP IN THE SINAI, WE AGREED TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY.

15. THIS DECISION WAS TAKEN, NOT BECAUSE IT WAS NECESSARILY THE BEST HYPOTHETICAL COURSE, BUT BECAUSE AFTER WEIGHING THE ALTERNATIVES, WE CONCLUDED THAT IF IT WERE POSSIBLE TO GET ANOTHER SIGNIFICANT AGREEMENT BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL THIS WOULD BE THE MOST PRACTICAL WAY TO GET SOME DEMONSTRABLE MOVEMENT IN A MEASURABLE TIME PERIOD BEFORE FRUSTRATIONS BUILD UP IN THE AREA. NONE OF THE ALTERNATIVES COULD ACHIEVE WHAT WAS NEEDED IN TIME.

16. IN EFFECT WE SPENT FIVE MONTHS LAYING THE GROUNDWORK THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS WITH THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED. IT WAS A KIND OF SHUTTLE DIPLOMACY, BUT WITH OUT AMBASSADORS DOING THE SHUTTLLING. OUR AMBASSADOR IN EGYPT MADE NINE TRIPS TO WASHINGTON DURING THIS PERIOD. WE WERE CONVINCED BOTH SIDES HAD ALSO MADE THE DECISION THAT THIS WAS THE BEST OF AVAILABLE ALTERNATIVES AND THAT THEY WERE PREPARED TO MAKE A MAJOR SERIOUS EFFORT.

17. A LOT OF ISSUES HAD TO BE DISCUSSED, AND THE TWO PARTIES NEEDED TO BE BROUGHT TO WITHIN A REASONABLY MUTUAL NEGOTIATING FRAMEWORK. CONTRARY TO SOME PRESS SPECULATION, A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME WAS NOT A FOREGONE CONCLUSION; THE NEGOTIATIONS WERE TOUGH, INTENSE, AND VERY COMPLEX. WE DID NOT KNOW IF WE COULD
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ACHIEVE SUCCESS BUT FELT THE ODDS WERE BETTER THAN EVEN AND THE CHANCE MUST BE TAKEN.

18. THE QUESTION ARISES AS TO WHAT WAS NEW IN THE LATEST NEGOTIATIONS:

-- IN GENERAL, BOTH SIDES HAD TAKEN A HARD LOOK AT THEIR ALTERNATIVES.

-- SPECIFICALLY, ISRAEL HAD AGREED NOT TO DEMAND A FORMAL END TO THE STATE OF BELLIGERENCY; THIS HAD BEEN A MAJOR ISSUE IN MARCH.

-- EGYPT AGREED TO INCLUDE SOME ADDITIONAL COMMITMENTS IN EXCHANGE FOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, FOR EXAMPLE, EGYPT'S COMMITMENT NOT TO ENGAGE IN MILITARY BLOCKADE.

-- BOTH SIDES AGREED TO RESOLVE THE IMPASSE OVER THE MAINTENANCE OF THE EARLY WARNING SYSTEM WHICH ISRAEL HAD INSISTED ON MAINTAINING IN THE AREA OF THE GADDI PASS BY ENTRUSTING THE SYSTEM TO A SMALL NUMBER OF US CIVILIAN PERSONNEL.

19. THE ISSUES IN THE SHUTTLE PART OF THE NEGOTIATIONS OF THE LAST FEW WEEKS WERE:

-- DRAWING A PRECISE LINE FOR THE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, NOT ONLY IN THE PASSES, BUT ALSO TO THE NORTH AND SOUTH ALONG THE COAST AND OIL FIELDS.

-- DRAWING A PRECISE LINE TO WHICH THE EGYPTIANS WOULD MOVE FORWARD.

-- DEFINING PRECISELY THE US ROLE IN THE EARLY WARNING SYSTEM.

-- ARRANGING FOR ACCESS TO AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE SINAI COASTAL OIL FIELDS AREA.

-- DRAWING UP A PRECISE AGREED FORMULATION OF ALL OF THE COMMITMENTS IN THE AGREEMENT AND ANNEX, INCLUDING THE KEY ONE, THAT NEITHER SIDE WOULD RESORT TO FORCE IN ACHIEVING A SECRET

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SETTLEMENT.

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LIMDIS

20) THE AGREEMENT SIGNED YESTERDAY BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL

CONTAINED SEVERAL BASIC ELEMENTS:

-- THE AGREEMENT.

-- THE ANNEX; IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THIS ANNEX WITH DETAILS ON
FORCE LIMITATIONS AND SURVEILLANCE HAS BEEN MADE A PUBLIC DOCUMENT
FOR THE FIRST TIME. THIS IS A HEARTENING SIGN.

-- THE OFFICIAL MAP ATTACHED TO THE AGREEMENT.

-- THE PROPOSAL ENTRUSTING THE EARLY WARNING SYSTEM TO THE US.
THIS WAS NOT AN AGREEMENT SIGNED BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT,
BUT IT IS AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE US AND ISRAEL AND BETWEEN
THE US AND EGYPT.

(21) THERE ARE IMPORTANT POLITICAL ELEMENTS IN THIS AGREEMENT:

-- THERE IS A GENERAL COMMITMENT TO PEACEFUL RATHER THAN MILITARY
RESOLUTION OF THE ARAB/ISRAELI CONFLICT AND OF THE CONFLICT
BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

-- THERE IS A COMMITMENT NOT TO USE OR THREATEN THE USE OF FORCE
OR MILITARY BLOCKADE.

-- THE AGREEMENT IS TO REMAIN IN FORCE UNTIL SUPERSEDED BY ANOTHER
AGREEMENT; IN EFFECT,

-- ISRAELI NON-MILITARY CARGOES CAN GO THROUGH THE CANAL.

THIS WAS ALSO AGREED IN THE AGREEMENT OF JANUARY 1974, BUT WAS NOT
MADE PUBLIC AS IT HAS BEEN THIS TIME.

-- THERE IS AN EGYPTIAN ZONE ESTABLISHED IN THE SINAI FROM THE
CITY OF SUEZ TO THE COASTAL OIL FIELDS IN WHICH THERE ARE NO
MILITARY FORCES OR PARA-MILITARY FORCES. THIS ZONE IS DIFFERENT
FROM A BUFFER ZONE WHICH IS UNEF-SUPERVISED EMPTY SPACE, IN
THAT IT IS UNDER CIVIL ADMINISTRATION AND ESTABLISHES THE PRINCIPLE
OF DEMILITARIZATION OF AN AREA IN SINAI RELINQUISHED BY ISRAEL
TO EGYPT

(22) THE TERRITORIAL ELEMENTS OF THE AGREEMENT ARE:

-- ISRAEL CAN REASONABLY BE SAID TO BE OUT OF THE PASSES;
HOWEVER, IT STILL RETAINS STRATEGIC POSITIONS ON THE HIGH GROUND
AROUND THE PASSES.

-- ISRAEL IS OUT OF THE CONTIGUOUS TERRITORY FROM THE OIL FIELDS
TO SUEZ CITY; HOWEVER, ISRAEL STILL MAINTAINS STRATEGIC POSITIONS
ON THE HIGH GROUND TO THE EAST OF THE OIL FIELDS.

-- THERE HAS BEEN A CONSIDERABLE BROADENING OF THE BUFFER ZONE
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IN WHICH THE UNEF WILL OPERATE.

-- ISRAEL'S MAIN DEFENSIVE POSITIONS (BIR JIFJafa, BIR HASANA)
REMAIN IN PLACE.

-- THE CONCEPT OF AREAS OF LIMITED ARMAMENT AND FORCES IN THE FIRST
AGREEMENT IS CARRIED OVER INTO THIS AGREEMENT.

(23) THE POINTS ON THE SURVEILLANCE OF THE BUFFER ZONE AND
ARMS LIMITATIONS INCLUDE:

-- ISRAEL WILL MAINTAIN ITS EARLY WARNING SYSTEM AT UM KUSHAIB.

-- EGYPT CAN CONSTRUCT A COMPARABLE STATION.

-- THE US WILL HAVE A CUSTODIAL ROLE IN THE STATIONS OPERATED BY
EGYPT AND ISRAEL, TO MONITOR THAT THEY ARE USED FOR ONLY EARLY
WARNING PURPOSES, AND WILL ALSO HAVE A DIRECT ROLE, OPERATING
THREE WATCH STATIONS OR POSTS IN THE PASSES, WITH SENORS AT THE
ENTRANCES TO BOTH PASSES.

-- THERE WILL ALSO BE US AERIAL SURVEILLANCE OF THE AGREEMENT, A
POINT ALSO INCLUDED IN THE 1974 DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT, BUT WHICH
IS NOW RECONFIRMED IN A PUBLISHED DOCUMENT.

-- THE UNEF WILL CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN SUPERVISION OF THE BUFFER
ZONE AND WILL CHECK THE AREAS OF LIMITED ARMAMENTS AND FORCES.

-- THERE WILL BE A JOINT COMMISSION BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL, WITH UN COMMANDING GENERAL OR HIS REPRESENTATIVE, TO HANDLE ALLEGATIONS OF VIOLATIONS.

(24) THE US ROLE CAME ABOUT AS A RESULT OF THE NEED TO FIND A WAY TO BRIDGE APPARENTLY INCOMPATIBLE ISRAELI AND EGYPTIAN POSITIONS. ISRAEL MADE IT A CONDITION FOR AN AGREEMENT THAT IT RETAIN ITS ELECTRONIC EARLY WARNING STATION AT UM KUSHAIDB, NORTH AND WEST OF THE GIDDI PASS. THIS PROBLEM REQUIRED A SOLUTION THAT WOULD SATISFY SADAT'S INSISTENCE THAT ISRAELI FORCES NOT BE LEFT ON EGYPTIAN TERRITORY ISRAEL HAD EVACUATED.

(25) THE US ROLE WILL INCLUDE:

-- A CUSTODIAL ROLE AT ISRAELI AND EGYPTIAN STATIONS, WHICH PROVIDE STRATEGIC WARNING.

-- US WATCH STATION WILL CHECK ACCESS TO THE AREA AND PROVIDE TACTICAL WARNING.

-- A US CIVILIAN ORGANIZATION OF NO MORE THAN 200 MEN, WITH NO MORE THAN A HUNDRED ON STATION AT ANY ONE TIME.

-- THE US ROLE IS THUS LIMITED IN PRACTICE AND IS ALSO LIMITED BY TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT.

(26) WHY IS A US ROLE NEEDED?

-- FIRST, IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO ACHIEVE A SOLUTION SATISFACTORY TO BOTH SIDES, SINCE ISRAEL INSISTED ON RETAINING ITS STATION.

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-- SECOND, THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN NO AGREEMENT WITHOUT THE US ROLE.

-- THIRD, BOTH SIDES TOLD US IN THE END THEY FELT A US PRESENCE WOULD HELP STABILIZE THE BUFFER ZONE.

27. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE AGREEMENT, AS WE PERCEIVE IT, IS THAT IT IS THE FIRST AGREEMENT SIGNED BETWEEN ISRAEL AND AN ARAB COUNTRY NOT IN THE IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH OF HOSTILITIES. EARLIER AGREEMENTS WERE INTENDED TO DIFFUSE THE IMMEDIATE EFFECTS OF WAR. THIS ONE WAS ACHIEVED ALMOST TWO YEARS AFTER THE END OF HOSTILITIES AND, AS THE SECRETARY SAID, IT COULD BE THE POINT AT WHICH THE MIDDLE EAST BEGAN TO TURN TOWARD PEACE. FINALLY, IT IS CAST IN TERMS OF AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT IN LEGAL FORM: THE FIRST SENTENCE OF THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL MAKES CLEAR THAT IT IS AN AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO BY THEIR GOVERNMENTS.

28. THE AGREEMENT IS ALSO SIGNIFICANT BECAUSE, IF IT IS TO WORK, IT WILL REQUIRE A DEGREE OF PRACTICAL COOPERATION BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL THAT COULD MOVE THEM TOWARD A MORE NORMAL RELATIONSHIP. THE TWO SIDES WILL HAVE TO SETTLE PROBLEMS RELATING TO THE AGREEMENT THROUGH A JOINT COMMISSION. THEY WILL HAVE TO WORK OUT THE QUESTION OF HOW TO TURN THE OIL FIELDS OVER TO EGYPT. UNTIL NEW ROADS CAN BE BUILT, THEY WILL HAVE TO USE PARTS OF THE SAME ROADS. MANY OF THESE PROBLEMS WERE LEFT FOR THE PROTOCOL, AND THEY WILL HAVE TO BE HAMMERED OUT BY THE TWO SIDES IN GENEVA IN THE MILITARY WORKING GROUP. IN SUM, BY STABILIZING THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI FRONT FOR SOME TIME, THE AGREEMENT WILL PROVIDE A MORE NORMAL, LESS HIGH-PRESSURE ATMOSPHERE, IN WHICH BROADER NEGOTIATIONS CAN BE CONDUCTED MORE RATIONALLY AND AT A MORE MEASURED PACE.

29. WHAT HAPPENS NEXT?

-- FIRST, EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI DELEGATIONS WILL MEET FOR TWO WEEKS IN GENEVA TO NEGOTIATE THE IMPLEMENTING PROTOCOL.
-- DURING THIS TIME, WE WILL SEEK CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL OF THE PROPOSAL FOR A US ROLE, IN THE EARLY WARNING SYSTEM.
-- UPON COMPLETION OF THESE TWO STEPS, THE AGREEMENT WILL GO INTO EFFECT AND IMPLEMENTATION WILL BEGIN. IMPLEMENTATION WILL TAKE ABOUT FIVE MONTHS TO COMPLETE, A PERIOD LASTING INTO LATE FEBRUARY OF NEXT YEAR.
-- OUR EXPECTATION IS THAT ONCE IMPLEMENTATION IS UNDER WAY, THERE WILL BE EXPLORATORY TALKS ABOUT FUTURE STAGES OF THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS INVOLVING OTHER PARTICIPANTS, WHICH WILL
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LIKELY INCLUDE SYRIA AND ISRAEL IN THE FIRST INSTANCE.

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AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY
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30. IN SUMMING UP HIS PRESENTATION, ATHERTON SAID WE RECOGNIZE IT IS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL TO MAINTAIN THE MOMENTUM OF THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. WE MUST NOT GET INTO ANOTHER STALEMATE. IT IS IMPORTANT TO BUILD ON THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BOOST ALREADY ACHIEVED AND TO KEEP THE OPPONENTS OF A NEGOTIATED PEACE FROM SEIZING THE INITIATIVE. AT THE SAME TIME, IT WILL BE IMPORTANT FOR ALL CONCERNED TO TRY TO CURB UNDUE IMPATIENCE AND AN EXCESSIVE SENSE OF URGENCY. WE MUST MAINTAIN A SENSE OF REALITY AND RECOGNIZE THAT WE WILL NOT ACHIEVE A FINAL SETTLEMENT OVERNIGHT.

(31) WE ARE WORKING, HE SAID, AGAINST A BACKGROUND OF 25 YEARS OF STALEMATE AND FATALISM, OF ASSUMPTIONS ON BOTH SIDES THAT THEIR INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES WERE BASICALLY INCOMPATIBLE. WE NOW SEE THE FIRST GLIMMERING OF HOPE, OF CHANGES IN ATTITUDE THAT ARE LESS THAN TWO YEARS OLD. IT IS UNDERSTANDABLE THAT THERE SHOULD BE SKEPTICISM ABOUT WHETHER THIS AGREEMENT IS THE BEGINNING OF A PEACE PROCESS. SADAT CALLED IT A "TURNING POINT". HOWEVER, ARAB SKEPTICS VIEW IT AS A NEW FROZEN STATUS QUO. IN THE LONGER PERSPECTIVE, THE ANSWER WILL DEPEND IN LARGE MEASURE ON ATTITUDES TOWARD THIS AGREEMENT. IF ONE STARTS FROM ASSUMPTIONS THAT ARE PESSIMISTIC, THIS MAY PRODUCE PESSIMISTIC RESULTS -- ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF THE SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECY WHICH HAS PLAGUED ARAB-ISRAELI RELATIONS FOR SO MANY YEARS. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF PATIENCE AND REALISM AND CONFIDENCE PREVAIL THEN THIS AGREEMENT CAN BE A NEW BEGINNING FOR A SOLUTION OF THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT, PERHAPS PRECISELY FOR THE REASON THAT THE AGREEMENT IS BEING CRITICIZED BY SOME: NAMELY BECAUSE IN THE AGREEMENT AND IN THE NEGOTIATION BOTH SIDES DEMONSTRATED A WILLINGNESS TO MEET EACH OTHER'S CONCERNS, TO SHOW SOME PERCEPTION OF THE PROBLEMS OF THE OTHER SIDE, AND TO SETTLE FOR LESS THAN WHAT THEY STARTED BY SAYING WAS THE ABSOLUTE MINIMUM.

32. ATHERTON CONCLUDED THAT IF THERE IS ANY THOUGHT HE WOULD LIKE TO LEAVE WITH THE ALLIES, IT IS THE HOPE THAT ALL OF US WILL EMPHASIZE WITH THE PARTIES CONCERNED THE NEED FOR PATIENCE AND FAR-SIGHTEDNESS- OF THE KIND SADAT HAS CERTAINLY SHOWN; THE NEED FOR LESS CYNICISM THAN THIS PROBLEM USUALLY EVOKES AMONG

ITS OBSERVERS; AND ABOVE ALL, THE NEED FOR THESE GOVERNMENTS TO
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EXAMINE THEIR ALTERNATIVES BEFORE DECIDING ON ANY COURSE OF ACTION
THAT COULD LEAD TO ABANDONING THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS NOW UNDER WAY.

33. LUNS THANKED ATHERTON FOR HIS PRESENTATION. HE SAID THE AGREEMENT
APPEARED TO BE EVEN MORE IMPORTANT THAN HE HAD EARLIER THOUGHT.
HE BELIEVED THE US AS AWHOLE AND ITS GOVERNMENT HAD GAINED
IMPRESSIVELY IN CREDIBILITY THROUGH ITS MADDLE EAST EFFORTS. THIS
IS PARTICULARLY TRUE WHEN THE US POSITION ISHQMPARED TO THAT OF
THE USSR WHICH APPEARS TO BE LOSING CREDIBILITY BECAUSE OF ITS
MIDDLE EAST POLICIES.

34. AMBASSADOR MENZIES (CANADA) JOINED IN THANKING ATHERTON. HE
SAID CANADA WAS INTENSELY INTERESTED IN THE MIDDLE EAST BECAUSE
IT WAS THE MOST EXPLOSIVE ISSUE IN THE WORLD TODAY AND ALSO BECAUSE
OF CANADIAN PARTICIPATION IN UNEF. MENZIES ASKED WHETHER THE TECHNICAL

OBSERVATIONS OF US OBSERVERS WOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE TO BOTH SIDES
AND WHETHER THE EGYPTIANS AND ISRAELIS MUST RELY ON THE WORD OF US
OBSERVERS REGARDING INDICATIONS OF ANY VIOLATIONS. MENZIES ASKED
ABOUT THE RELATIONSHIP OF US PERSONNEL TO UNEF AND WHY THESE
AMERICAN CIVILIANS WOULD BE AUTHORIZED TO CARRY ARMS. SPECULATING
ON WHERE WE GO FROM HERE, MENZIES SAID THE US SEEMED TO HAVE
GIVEN SIGNIFICANT MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSURANCES TO THE ISRAELIS.
SINCE HE UNDERSTOOD THE AGREEMENT WAS EFFECTIVE FOR ONLY THREE
YEARS, HE WONDERED WHAT FURTHER LEVERAGE THE US MIGHT HAVE WITH
ISRAEL IN PRESSING AHEAD ON NEGOTIATIONS REGARDING THE GOLAN
HEIGHTS.

35. ATHERTON REPLIED THAT THE US CIVILIAN PERSONNEL WOULD HAVE
NO ORGANIC TIETO UNEF OR TO ANY OF THE UN BODIES IN THE AREA.
IN PRACTICE, HOWEVER, OUR PERSONNEL WILL HAVE TO ESTABLISH CLOSE
WORKING RELATIONSHIPS WITH UNEF. THE PRINCIPAL INFORMATION
GATHERING AND OBSERVATION WOULD BE CARRIED OUT BY EGYPTIAN AND
ISRAELI STATIONS, MANNED BY EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI PERSONNEL.
THE US ROLE WAS NOT TO RUN THE STATIONS, BUT RATHER TO VERIFY
THAT THE EGYPTIANS AND ISRAELIS WERE ONLY CONDUCTING MONITORING
ACTIVITIES AT THE STATIONS. THE US WATCH STATIONS WOULD NOT BE AS
ELABORATE OR AS SOPHISTICATED, AND THEY WOULD NOT MONITOR POSSIBLE
AERIAL INTRUSIONS. THE US STATIONS WOULD PROVIDE GROUND SENSORS
AT EITHER END OF TWO PASSES WHICH WOULD BE READ BY US PERSONNEL
LOCATED IN THE PASSES. IF UNAUTHORIZED MOVEMENTS WERE NOTED, THE
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US WOULD INFORM BOTH SIDES AND THE UNEF. ATHERTON NOTED THAT
AMERICAN CIVILIANS WOULD CARRY ONLY SMALL ARMS BY TERMS OF THE
AGREEMENT. THESE WERE INTENDED FOR PERSONAL SELF DEFENSE,
AND WERE REQUIRED BECAUSE OF THE CONDITIONS IN THE SINAI.

36. TURNING TO MENZIES' QUESTION ABOUT THE FUTURE, ATHERTON SAID
OF COURSE IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO BE PRECISE IN OUTLINING WHAT FURTHER
DEVELOPMENTS MIGHT BRING, HE EMPHASIZED, HOWEVER, THAT THERE
WAS NO TIME LIMIT BUILT INTO THE NEW AGREEMENT
EXCEPT THE CONCEPT THAT IT WOULD EVENTUALLY BE
REPLACED BY A SUSEQUENT AGREEMENT. THE QUESTION OF
A LIMITED TIME FRAME RELATED TO MAINTENANCE OF
UNEF. BUT SADAT HAS ALREADY SAID PUBLICLY THAT
HE IS PREPARED TO RENEW UNEF WHEN THE PRESENT AND
NEXT YEARS TERMS EXPIRE, AND WE HAVE SOME ASSURANCES
THAT BOTH SIDES WILL WISH TO CONTINUE UNEF FOR AT
LEAST ANOTHER YEAR BEYOND THAT TERM.

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INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS PRIORITY 5472

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37. AS FOR PROSPECTS ON THE GOLAN HEIGHTS, ATHERTON SAID THERE WAS NO COMMITMENT OR PRECONDITION REGARDING THIS ISSUE IN THE PRESENT AGREEMENT. HOWEVER, THE US HAS INDICATED TO ISRAEL, SYRIA, AND EGYPT THAT WE WILL MAKE A GOOD FAITH EFFORT TO GET A NEGOTIATING PROCESS STARTED. IT IS DIFFICULT TO SAY WHAT CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED. ISRAEL FEELS STRONGLY THAT THE GOLAN HEIGHTS ARE IMPORTANT FOR PROTECTING THE VALLEY. MOREOVER, ANY FURTHER MOVEMENT OF THE PRESENT LINE OF THE GOLAN HEIGHTS WILL AFFECT ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS. THIS IS AN EXTREMELY DIFFICULT POLITICAL PROBLEM FOR ISRAEL. NO ONE CAN SAY HOW FAST OR HOW FAR PROGRESS CAN BE MADE. BUT WE WILL MAKE A SERIOUS EFFORT. ON MENZIES QUESTION OF LEVERAGE, ATHERTON SAID HE PREFERRED TO FURMULSTE THIS DIFFERENTLY. THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS IS BASED ON OBJECTIVE CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH CREATE THEIR OWN PRESSURE FOR PROGRESS. AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN RECENT NEGOTIATIONS WAS THE DESIRE OF ISRAEL TO MAINTAIN GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES. IT IS NO SECRET THAT CERTAIN STRAINS DEVELOPED DURING THE REASSESSMENT PERIOD. BUT THESE STRAINS AND PRESSURES ARE INHERENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION AND FAILURE TO MAKE PROGRESS WILL LEAD TO OBJECTIVE CONDITIONS WHERE ALL CONCERNED WILL HAVE TO FACE UP TO THE DRAWBACKS OF NOT TRYING TO MOVE AHEAD.

38. AMBASSADOR KRAPF (FRG) THANKED ATHERTON FOR HIS EXCELLENT BRIEFING AND CONGRATULATED THE UNITED STATES FOR ADIPLOMATIC ACHIEVEMENT OF GREAT IMPORTANCE FOR ALL THEALLIES. KRAPF AGREED WITH ATHERTON ABOUT THE NEED OF BOTH PARTIES FOR PATIENCE AND THE MAINTENANCE OF MOMENTUM IN THE MIDDLE EAST NOTING THAT WHILE THESE WERE CONTRADICTORY GOALS, THEY WERE INDEED ESSENTIAL TO FURTHER PROGRESS. KRAPF ALSO AGREED THAT STEPS ON THE SYRIAN FRONT WERE IMPORTANT AND THAT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SINAI AGREEMENT MIGHT PROVIDE EXPERIENCE AND EXAMPLES WHICH WOULD PERMIT PROGRESS ON ISRAELI-SYRIAN ISSUES.

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39. KRAPF ASKED HOW PATIENT THE US EXPECTED THE SYRIAN LEADERSHIP TO BE, AND WHAT MARGINS FOR MANEUVER DID THE US BELIEVE THE ISRAELIS HAD FOR DEALING WITH THE SYRIAN PROBLEM. GIVEN DOMESTIC REACTION IN ISRAEL TO THE SINAI AGREEMENT, ARE THERE ANY TOLERANCES LEFT THAT WOULD PERMIT AN ACCOMMODATION WITH SYRIA? KRAPF ALSO ASKED HOW THE SOVIETS HAD REACTED TO THE SINAI AGREEMENT. HE OBSERVED THAT THEY WERE CLEARLY UNHAPPY, BUT WONDERED IF THIS MEANT THE SOVIETS WOULD ACQUIESCE IN A SECONDARY ROLE OR WOULD ATTEMPT TO REINSERT THEMSELVES IN THE SITUATION THROUGH NEW INITIATIVES.

40. ATHERTON REPLIED THAT THERE WERE MANY IMPONDERABLES AT PLAY IN THE ISRAELI-SYRIAN SITUATION. PRESIDENT ASAD HAD SHOWN CONSIDERABLE PATIENCE IN THE PAST AND SEEMS CONFIDENT THAT HE CAN RETAIN HIS AUTHORITY DESPITE CRITICISM OF SYRIAN POLICY FROM THE PALESTINIANS AND FROM IRAQ AND LIBYA. ASAD IS A REALIST AND PONDERES HIS MOVES WITH CARE AND THOROUGHNESS. THE SECRETARY HAD SEEN HIM TWICE DURING HIS RECENT MIDEAST EFFORTS, AND IT WAS CLEAR THAT ASAD WAS NOT HAPPY WITH THE SINAI AGREEMENT AND HE WOULD HAVE PREFERRED AN AGREEMENT IN WHICH SYRIA WAS SOMEHOW INVOLVED. HE SEEMED PREPARED, HOWEVER, TO WAIT AND SEE WHAT NEXT STEPS MIGHT BE TAKEN. THE STATEMENTS OF OTHER ARAB LEADERS TO ASAD WILL BE IMPORTANT, PARTICULARLY THOSE OF SAUDI ARABIA. IT IS ENCOURAGING TO NOTE THAT THE SAUDI FOREIGN MINISTER, PRINCE SAUD, REACTED FAVORABLY TO THE SINAI ACCORD WHEN THE SECRETARY'S PARTY MET WITH HIM LAST WEEK. IF THE SAUDIS CONTINUE TO ENCOURAGE THE SYRIANS TO BE PATIENT, THIS WILL HELP PROVIDE TIME FOR CAREFUL DIPLOMACY. ATHERTON EMPHASIZED THAT WHILE THE SITUATION IS FULL OF IMPONDERABLE, THE US DOES NOT INTEND TO LET MONTHS GO BY BEFORE EXPLOYING THE POSSIBILITY OF DOING SOMETHING IN THE SYRIA-ISRAEL CONTEXT.

41. AS TO MARGINS FOR FUTURE ISRAELI FLEXIBILITY, ATHERTON NOTED THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD INDEED BEEN COMPLETELY ABSORBED WITH THE AGREEMENT THAT WAS
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JUST SIGNED. THERE HAD BEEN MANY DEMONSTRATIONS AND THE EMOTIONAL LEVEL WAS HIGH. BUT WITH THE AGREEMENT SIGNED AND WITH A NOTE IN THE KNESSET WHICH WAS MORE FAVORABLE THAN EXPECTED, SOME HEALING EFFECT MAY BE GENERATED. EXPERIENCE OVER TIME MIGHT LEAD MORE ISRAELIS TO SEE THE AGREEMENT AS A GOOD ONE. THE FACT, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT PRESIDENT SADAT IS ALSO BEING CRITICIZED FOR THE AGREEMENT MAY HELP THE ISRAELIS PUT IT IN A MORE POSITIVE PERSPECTIVE. THIS

IN TURN COULD INFLUENCE THE ATMOSPHERE FOR EXPLORING THE POSSIBILITIES OF A FUTHER AGREEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND SYRIA ON THE GOLAN HEIGHTS.

42. CHARGE DE LA FERRIERE (FRANCE) CONGRATULATED THE UNITED STATES AND PRAISED SECRETARY KISSINGER FOR HIS COURAGE AND PERSERVERANCE IN REACHING AGREEMENT IN THIS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT AREA. FRANCE CANNOT BUT REJOINCE IN THIS ACCORD WHICH IS SO IMPORTANT FOR THE WEST AND FOR THE ENTIRE WORLD. HE HOPED IT WOULD AVOID WAR BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL. MOREOVER, THE AGREEMENT MIGHT REDUCE RISKS ON NATOS SOUTHEASTERN FLANK AND IF SO, IT WILL BE THE FIRST GOOD MEWS FROM THAT QUARTER IN A LONG TME. THE AGREEMENT MIGHT HELP ISRAELS RELATIONS WITH OTHER WESTERN STATES, INCLUDING FRANCE. TO FRANCE, THE AGREEMENT SEEMS FAIR TO ALL PARTIES, AND PARIS WAS ALSO GLAD TO SEE THE UNITED STATES STRENGTHEN ITS ABILITY TO OPERATE SUCCESSFULLY FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

43. ON THE BASIS OF CONSIDERABLE EXPERIENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, DE LA FERRIERE SAND THE AGREEMENT HAD A GOOD CHANCE OF ENDURING SO LONG AS SADAT WAS IN POWER. THE EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT SHOULD THUS BE ADMIRER FOR HIS COURAGE AND FORESIGHT. DE LA FERRIERE NOTED THAT THE AGREEMENT SPLITS THE SINAI IN A WAY THAT IS SATISFACTORY TO BOTH PARIIES BECAUSE IT GUARANTEES ISRAELS SECURITY INTERESTS WHILE RETURNING THE OIL FIELDS AND GREATER TERRITORY ON THE EAST BANK OF THE SUEZ CANAL TO THE EGYPTIANS. THIS TERRITORIAL AGREEMENT MIGHT, THEREFORE, BECOME THE FRAMEWORK OF A LONGER TERM BOUNDARY SETTLEMENT
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BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL.

44. IF THE AGREEMENT STABILIZES ISRAELS SOUTHERN FRONT, THE GOI WILL BE ABLE TO CONCENTRATE ITS EFFORTS ON OTHER AREAS. THIS MIGHT WELL BE NECESSARY SINCE PALESTINIAN ORGANIZATIONS MIGHT BECOME MORE RADICAL AND MORE ACTIVE BECAUSE OF THE SINAI ACCORDS. MOREOVER, INTERNAL STABILITY IN LEBANON AND JORDAN MIGHT BE WEAKENED. WHILE OTHER ARABS MIGHT BE PAITIENT IN NOT WANTING TOO MUCH TOO SOON, THE PALESTINIANS FEEL DIFFERENTLY AND, SINCE THEY HAVE BEEN DOMINATED FROM OUTSIDE FOR EIGHT YEARS, A DISASTROUS SITUATION COULD DEVELOP UNLESS AN OVERALL SOLUTION CAN BE REACHED WHICH ULTIMATELY MEETS THEIR CONCERNS. THUS, WHILE THE STEP BY STEP APPROACH IS A GOOD ONE, SOMETHING MUST BE INCLUDED TO GIVE THE PALESTINIANS HOPE FOR THE FUTURE IF THE PRESENT AGREEMENT IS TO WORK.

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45. DE LA FERRIERE ALSO ASKED WHAT PART THE US BELIEVED
THE SOVIET UNION MIGHT PLAY. WHILE MOSCOW CCOULD NOT

EXPECT A MAJOR ROLE WHERE ITS INFLUENCE CLEARLY IS IN ECLIPSE (E.G. IN EGYPT AND ISRAEL), DIFFICULTIES COULD MATERIALIZE IF THE SOVIETS WERE LEFT WITH ONLY THE EASY ROLE OF STIMULATING TROUBLE IN THE ARAB WORLD AND PARTICULARLY AMONG THE PALESTINIANS.

46. ATHERTON THANKED DE LA FERRIERE FOR HIS KIND WORDS ABOUT THE US ACCOMPLISHMENT AND AGREED FULLY WITH HIM THAT MUCH REMAINED TO BE DONE. THE BASIC US APPROACH TO THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION DEPARTS FROM THE CONVICTION THAT NO SETTLEMENT IS POSSIBLE WITHOUT SOME ACCOMMODATION OF PALESTINIAN ASPIRATIONS. THE ONLY QUESTION IS WHEN AND HOW THIS CAN BE ACHIEVED. IN SETTING PRIORITIES AND ASSESSING THE RELATIVE DIFFICULTIES INHERENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION, IT HAD SEEMED TO THE US EASIEST TO COPE WITH THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM AFTER SOME OTHER KEY ISSUES HAD BEEN RESOLVED. ALL ISRAELIS BELIEVE THAT THE PLO IS DEDICATED TO ISRAEL'S ULTIMATE DISAPPEARANCE. WHILE THE US RECOGNIZES THAT MANY PALESTINIANS REALIZE THIS GOAL IS UNREALISTIC AND SOME FUTURE AGREEMENT MAY BE POSSIBLE, WE ARE DEALING IN AN AREA LARGELY GOVERNED BY PERCEPTIONS RATHER THAN BY OBJECTIVE FACTS. WHILE THE US HAS ACCORDINGLY RESISTED SEEING THE PALESTINE ISSUE COME TO THE FORE TOO EARLY, WE HAVE REPEATEDLY ASSURED THE ARAB GOVERNMENTS THAT WE AGREE THAT THE PALESTINIANS MUST BE CONSIDERED AND THAT SOME ARRANGEMENT MUST BE MADE TO GIVE THEM A SENSE OF IDENTITY AND MEET THEIR LEGITIMATE ASPIRATIONS. EFFORTS TO GO TOO FAST TOO SOON IN THIS DIRECTION, HOWEVER, MIGHT BE SELF DEFEATING.

47. ON THE QUESTION OF SEPARATE PLO REPRESENTATION AT GENEVA, THE UNITED STATES HAS REPEATEDLY TOLD THE ARABS THAT THIS WOULD STALEMATE THE CONFERENCE AT ITS OUTSET. THERE ARE MANY SHADES OF PALESTINIAN SECRET

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ATTITUDE, HOWEVER, RANGING FROM THE MOST DOCTRINAIRE TO THE MORE PRAGMATIC. YASIR ARAFAT SEEMS TO WANT TO INVOLVE HIMSELF IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE TIME IS NOT YET RIPE, HOWEVER, FOR PALESTINIAN INVOLVEMENT SINCE THE PALESTINIANS THEMSELVES HAVE NOT YET AGREED ON THEIR ULTIMATE GOALS. IT IS IMPORTANT, THEREFORE, THAT OTHERS NOT SET HARD GOALS NOW FOR WHAT THE PALESTINIANS SHOULD ULTIMATELY RECEIVE IN ANY OVERALL AGREEMENT.

48. CONCERNING THE SOVIET ROLE, ATHERTON NOTED THAT DURING ITS RECENT MIDDLE EAST REASSESSMENT, THE US KEPT ITS LINES OPEN TO MOSCOW. SECRETARY

KISSINGER SAW FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO IN GENEVA AND VIENNA. MOREOVER, THE SOVIETS WERE TOLD WHEN THE US WAS GOING TO LAUNCH ITS RECENT NEGOTIATING EFFORT. IT IS CLEAR THAT THE SOVIETS ARE NOT PLEASED WITH THEIR EXCLUSION FROM THE AGREEMENT AND WITH THE FEATURE WHICH PLACES US PERSONNEL IN SINAI EARLY WARNING SITES. SOVIET DISPLEASURE WAS CLEARLY DEMONSTRATED BY THEIR REFUSAL TO BE PRESENT AT THE SIGNING OF THE SINAI AGREEMENT IN GENEVA. THE US DOES NOT KNOW WHAT THE SOVIETS WILL DO NOW, BUT SO FAR, THEY HAVE NOT INTERFERED WITH THE STEP BY STEP APPROACH. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE ATTEMPTED TO EXPLOIT THE SITUATION, BUT JUDGEMENT ON THIS SHOULD BE RESERVED UNTIL SOVIET BEHAVIOR OVER THE LONGER TERM CAN BE ASSESSED. SECRETARY KISSINGER WILL SEE GROMYKO AT THE UNGA AND THIS MAY OFFER SOME INDICATIONS OF FUTURE SOVIET INTENTIONS. THE US RECOGNIZES THAT THE USSR MUST PLAY A ROLE IN A FINAL, OVERALL SETTLEMENT. WE HAVE MADE CLEAR TO THE SOVIETS THAT US EFFORTS TO DATE HAVE ONLY BEEN DIRECTED AT SETTING THE STAGE FOR SUCH A SETTLEMENT AND ARE NOT DESIGNED TO DENY A ROLE TO THE SOVIETS OR DIRECTED AGAINST LEGITIMATE SOVIET INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

49. AMBASSADOR THEODOROPoulos (GREECE) SAID THAT HIS QUESTIONS ABOUT PALESTINIAN REFUGEES AND THE SOVIET ROLE HAD ALREADY BEEN ANSWERED. HE THEREFORE ONLY
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WANTED TO CONGRATULATE THE UNITED STATES FOR ITS ACHIEVEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND TO THANK ASSISTANT SECRETARY AHERTON FOR HIS THOROUGH AND HELPFUL BRIEFING OF THE COUNCIL.

50. AMBASSADOR ERALP (TURKEY) SAID THE DETAILED AND THOROUGH BRIEFING TO THE COUNCIL WAS AN INDICATION OF THE IMPORTANCE THE US ATTACHES TO THE ALLIANCE. TURKEY, AS A COUNTRY LOCATED IN THE AREA, WAS GRATIFIED WITH THE AGREEMENT. ERALP'S ONLY QUESTION CONCERNED THE LOCATION OF US PLANES CONDUCTING AERIAL SURVEILLANCE OF THE SINAI. AHERTON REPLIED THAT IT SEEMS TO BE AN OPEN SECRET THAT THE PLANES ARE LOCATED SOMEWHERE IN THE

MEDITERRANEAN. HE POINTED OUT THAT UNDER THE ORIGINAL AGREEMENT, THE RESULTS OF US AERIAL SURVEILLANCE WERE SHARED EQUALLY WITH EGYPT AND ISRAEL. THIS WOULD CONTINUE UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT AND THE RESULTS WOULD NOW GO TO THE COMMANDER OF THE UNEF.

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INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS PRIORITY 5474

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51. AMBASSADOR HARTOGH (NETHERLANDS) ASSOCIATED HIMSELF WITH THE EXPRESSIONS OF GRATITUDE TO ATHERTON AND CONGRATULATIONS TO THE USG AND SECRETARY KISSINGER. HE ASKED HOW MUCH LONGER THE US FEELS THE STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH

CAN BE SUSTAINED WITHOUT TAKING ON THE WHOLE PROBLEM. DID WE BELIEVE MORE INTERIN STEPS WOULD BE POSSIBLE ON THE EGYPT-ISRAELI FRONT? ATHERTON SAID IT IS DIFFICULT NOW TO CONCEIVE OF ADDITIONAL INTERIM STEPS BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL. IF SYRIA AND ISREAL ACHIEVE AN INTERIN AGREEMENT, THIS WILL STILL LEAVE THE PROBLEM OF THE JORDANIAN FRONT. A FLAW IN THE EARLIER NEGOTIATIONS MAY HAVE BEEN THE FAILURE TO TAKE STEPS ON THE WEST BANK AND THAT MIGHT HAVE STRENGTHENED JORDANS POSITION AS A SPOKESMAN FOR THE PALESTINIANS. THE SITUATION MIGHT CHANGE IN THE MONTHS AHEAD, BUT AT PRESENT IT IS DIFFICULT TO THINK OF INTERIM STEPS THAT CAN BE TAKEN WITH THE PALESTINIANS WITHOUT COMING TO GRIPS WITH FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS. THESE ARE SOME OF THE PROBLEMS THAT WILL HAVE TO BE DEALT WITH IN THE MONTHS AHEAD.

52. AMBASSADOR BUSCH (NORWAY) JOINED IN THANKS FOR THE BRIEFING. THE NORWEGIAN PRIME MINISTER IN A PRESS CONFERENCE ON SEPTEMBER 3 EXPRESSED THE GREAT SATISFACTION OF THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT WITH THE AGREEMENT. THE AGREEMENT WAS REACHED THROUGH STATESMANSHIP AND WILLINGNESS TO COMPROMISE ON THE PART OF THE LEADERS OF EGYPT AND ISRAEL AND ALSO BY THE ROLE OF SECRETARY KISSINGER AS MEDIATOR. THE NORWEGIAN PRIME MINISTER HOPED THERE WOULD BE A LASTING SOLUTION, WHICH HE SAID, WOULD HAVE TO INCLUDE A SOLUTION TO THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM AND RECOGNITION OF THE RIGHT OF ISRAEL TO EXIST.

53. CHARGE BAL (BELGIUM) NOTED ATHERTON SAID THERE WAS NO ORGANIC LINK BETWEEN THE US CIVILIAN MONITORS AND THE UNEF AND THAT THE UNEF WOULD NOT BE ASSUMING ANY NEW FUNCTIONS. HE WONDERED WHETHER WE ANTICIPATED ANY DIFFICULTIES IN THE UN CONCERNING THE UNEF MANDATE. ATHERTON EXPLAINED THAT WE EXAMINED WHETHER THE EXISTING UNEF MANDATE IS SUFFICIENT AND CONCLUDED THAT NO NEW MANDATE IS NEEDED. THE MANDATE IS DUE TO BE EXTENDED OCTOBER 24, PRESUMABLY THIS TIME FOR SECRET

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A YEAR. THE US KEPT IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH SYG WALDHEIM DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS.

54. CHARGE MARGETSON (UK) CONGRATULATED SECRETARY KISSINGER. HE ASKED IF THE US FORSAW ANY CHANCE THE SOVIETS WOULD MAKE TROUBLE OVER THE RENEWAL OF THE UNEF MANDATE. ATHERTON SAID THERE WERE NO INDICATIONS OF SERIOUS TROUBLE SO FAR, ALTHOUGH THERE WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE STRONG WORDS. THE NEXT INDICATION OF SOVIET REACTION WILL BE WHETHER THEY SEND AN OBSERVER TO THE WORKING GROUP MEETING IN GENEVA NEXT WEEK. THERE ARE TWO PRECEDENTS, NEITHER THE US NOR THE SOVIETS HAD OBSERVERS AT THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI WORKING GROUP SESSIONS LAST YEAR, WHILE BOTH ATTENDED THE SYRIAN-ISRAELI WORKING GROUP SESSIONS.

55. CHARGE SPINELLI (ITALY) THANKED THE US FOR THE BRIEFING AND SAID THE ITALIAN POSITION HAD BEEN EXPRESSED DURING A PRESS CONFERENCE BY THE FOREIGN MINISTER IN NEW YORK.

56. CHARGE HOSTERT (LUXEMBOURG) JOINED THE CONGRATULATIONS. HE ASKED WHETHER THERE HAD BEEN ANY DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE OF JERUSALEM DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS. ATHERTON REPLIED THERE HAD BEEN NONE.

57. CHARGE VILLADSEN (DENMARK) THANKED THE US FOR THE BRIEFING AND SAID THE DANISH POSITION WAS COVERED BY HIS FOREIGN MINISTERS STATEMENT.

58. SYG LUND AGAIN THANKED THE US FOR THE PROMPT BRIEFING OF THE ALLIES. HE SAID THAT PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST ALSO FURTHERS PEACE IN EUROPE AND CONCLUDED THAT THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE AGREEMENT BY SECRETARY KISSINGER WAS A GREAT DAY FOR THE ALLIANCE.
BRUCE.

SECRET

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

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To: STATE INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS
USUN N Y
GENEVA
MOSCOW
AMMAN
BEIRUT

CAIRO
DAMASCUS
KUWAIT
JIDDA
DHAHRAN
JERUSALEM
KHARTOUM
MANAMA
TUNIS
TEL AVIV
TEHRAN
TRIPOLI
RABAT
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